The Effect of Pension on the Optimized Life Expectancy and Lifetime Utility Level by Shin, Inyong
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Effect of Pension on the Optimized
Life Expectancy and Lifetime Utility
Level
Inyong Shin
September 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41374/
MPRA Paper No. 41374, posted 11. March 2013 09:31 UTC
The Eect of Pension System on the Optimized Life Expectancy
and Lifetime Utility Level
Inyong Shin
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the eect of a pension system on the life expectancy and the
lifetime utility level using a cross country data and an optimal dynamic problem of individuals
who live in continuous and nite time. From the data, we nd that 1) Happiness can be almost
explained by income per capita. 2) Depending on income per capita, the pension system can
make life span longer or shorter and can raise or reduce the level of happiness. Our model
yields some results which are consistent with the results from the data: i) Life expectancy is
not always proportional to lifetime utility. ii) The pension system can make life expectancy
longer or shorter. This paper suggests that it is not always true that the pension system
improves the lifetime utility level.
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11 Introduction
According to an anecdote in Europe, as soon as a pension system was introduced, the number of
people who jog in the park for their health increased. Believe it or not, under the pension system,
it looks like a good deal, if we live long enough. This paper analyzes the eect of a pension system
on the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level. There are many literatures on the eect of
rising longevity on some economic variables as saving rate, growth rate, labor market, education,
etc. For example, Bloom et al. (2007) and Dushi et al. (2010), Lee et al. (2000) etc. examine
the eects of improvements in health or life expectancy on social security system and saving rate.
Weil (2007), Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Zhang and Zhang (2004), Zhang et al. (2001), etc.
analyze the eects of improvements in health or life expectancy on economic growth. Zhang et al.
(2003) shows that rising longevity encourages both savings and earlier retirement. Gorski et al.
(2007) studies the eects of a pension reform on the educational level of the economy. Pecchenino
and Utendorf (1999), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Cipriani (2000), Boucekkine, et al. (2002,
2003), Pecchenino and Pollard (1997, 2002) etc. analyze the eect of longer life span on economic
growth through the level of schooling and human capital accumulation. Recently, Pestieau and
Ponthiere (2012) surveys the various contributions to the impact of changes in longevity on various
public policies. However, there is little research on the opposite direction, that is, the economic
variables, except the level of income, aect life expectancy or health. This paper is dierent from
previous researches in that a pension system is the cause, and the life expectancy and the lifetime
utility level are its eects.
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical researches about the economic welfare of a pension
system has been accumulated. The main results of some previous studies on pension system
and economic welfare can be summarized as follows: under a fully funded system, the economic
welfare is not aected, however, under a pay-as-you-go pension system, depending on the economic
situations and generations, the economic welfare might be both improved or worsened. The
public pension system as a risk-hedging device can increase welfare by providing a certainty in
the imperfect market. (Shiller, 1999, Krueger and Kubler, 2002, Sanchez-Marcos and Sanchez-
Martin, 2006, Bohn, 2009, etc.) The compulsory pension system which is one of the forced saving
policies can lead to high saving rates. Meanwhile, the public pension system crowds out the
private savings. It can have a negative eect on the capital accumulation and can retard growth.
(Cutler and Gruber, 1996, Feldstein and Liebman, 2002, Zhang and Zhang, 2004, etc.) The
2overall welfare impact depends on the balance between the insurance eect and the crowding-out
eect. In this paper, we show that the pension system has both positive and negative eect on
welfare using a cross country data. More specically, the pension system has a positive eect on
welfare when income per capita is low, but the pension system has a negative eect on welfare
when income per capita is high.
We compare the utility level under the restriction of the pension system as a compulsory saving
with the utility level without the restriction. Many previous researches analyze economic welfare
using overlapping generation models. We use the optimal dynamic problem of individuals who live
in continuous time, but not discrete time which is used in the overlapping generation models. (e.g.
Chakraborty, 2004, Sanchez-Marcos and Sanchez-Martin, 2006, Ponthiere, 2009, etc.) This is one
of the dierences of our model from the previous models. To tell more specics, in many previous
overlapping generation models, the maximum life span is given (e.g., two-period or three-period)
and the survival probability is introduced and the life expectancy is calculated by the average
of the longevity of the people who live to the maximum life span and the people who die before
the maximum life span depending on the the survival probability. Actually, in two-period model,
only two kinds of ages (i.e, one-period-old and two-period-old) exist and nobody survives more
than the given period even thougn the life expectancy has variations. However, our model is
handled under continuous time and the agents decide the terminal point of the continuous model
for oneself to maximize his/her life time utility. Like lifetime uncertainty models, e.g., Pecchenino
and Pollard (1997), Chakraborty (2004), Momota, et al (2005), etc., we assume that it is possible
to extend life span by the eort of an individual through health investments.1 For example, eating
good food, taking some nutritional supplements, getting in shape by going to the gym, investing
in the development of medical technology, etc., longevity will arise due to the given examples
on health investments. In reality, it is well known that coronary heart disease (CHD) mortality
is highly inuenced by the major risk factors, e.g., serum cholesterol, systolic blood pressure,
diabetes, smoking habits, high alcohol consumption, lack of exercise and stress, etc. Lifestyle
changes through individual's eorts (e.g., healthier diet, physical exercise, cessation of smoking
and drinking) and medications have been shown to be eective in reducing coronary disease. If
we can eliminate the risk factors, the life expectacny will undoubtedly grow.
An individual distributes his/her budget to his/her basic needs and to his/her health invest-
1Lifetime uncertainty models assume that the health investments can increase the surviving probability. However,
we do not consider uncertainty in our model.
3ments to maximize his/her lifetime utility. We consider that the individual's longevity is based
from the result of the individual's utility maximization problem. This means that the individ-
ual's longevity is an endogenous variable and not exdogenous variable. We investigate how the
optimized life span and the lifetime utility level can be changed by a pension system.
In Section 2, using a cross country data, we show the following: 1) Income per capita can
almost explain happiness. The positive correlationship between life expectancy and happiness is
a spurious relationship in which two variables have no direct causal connection. In reality, income
per capita which is an unseen variable has caused both. And the life span does not have much
inuence on happiness. 2) Depending on income per capita, the pension system can make life
span longer or shorter. 3) Depending on income per capita, the pension system can raise or reduce
the level of happiness．In Section 3, our model yields two important results: i) Life expectancy is
not always proportional to lifetime utility level. ii) Pension system can make the life span longer
or shorter. The life span depends on the type of pension system. From the combination of the
results i) and ii), it is possible that A) the pension system makes the life span longer and increases
the utility level. B) the pension system makes the life span longer, however decreases the utility
level. C) the pension system makes the life span shorter and decreases the utility level. Case 1 is
preferable. But Case 2 and 3 are not preferable cases, but could possibly happen. Our results A),
B) and C) from the optimal problem are consistent with 2) and 3) that we will see in the data in
Section 2.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we conrm the relationship among income
per capita, the presence or absence of a pension system, happiness and life expectancy using a
cross country data. Section 3 presents the model and drives the benchmark outcomes. In section
4, we introduce the pension system to the benchmark. Section 5 solves the models numerically
and analyzes the results and concludes. And nally, we include an Appendix.
2 Empirical Facts
2.1 Data
We take up income per capita, life expectancy and the presence or absence of a pension system
as the determinants of happiness. The three variables are thought to be the variable that look at
an economic side, a biological side and a social systematic side to decide the level of happiness,
respectively. We can clarify how a pension system inuences happiness using a data. The data
4used by this paper can be easily acquired on the internet. The happiness index and the life
expectancy are available from World Database of Happiness and GDP per capita is also found
in Penn World table. The presence or absence of a pension system is obtained from Table 1 of
Bloom et al. (2007). World Database of Happiness releases the averages of the happiness index
and the life expectancy from 2000 to 2009 by country, respectively. The happiness index run from
0 to 10. GDP per capita uses the variable \rgdpch" in Penn World Table 7.1. According to the
Penn World Table 7.1, the denition of variable \rgdpch" is that PPP converted GDP per capita
(chain series), at 2005 constant prices. We calculate the average of GDP per capita from 2000
to 2009 to meet the happiness index and the life expectancy in World Database of Happiness.
We used the logarithm for GDP per capita, in the following analysis. The pension data which
are dummy variables for the presence or absence of a pension system show the situation in 2002.
The value is one when they have a pension system and the value is zero when they do not have a
pension system. The pension data use \Universal Coverage"．According to Bloom et al. (2007),
the denition is that the dummy variable of universal coverage indicates whether the system
covers all workers or not. Table 1 shows the detailed data source. World Database of Happiness,
Penn World Table 7.1 and the pension data in 2002 of Bloom et al. (2007) listed 149, 190 and
61 countries, respectively. We focus on the 61 countries which are included in all the three data
sets. Table A1 in Appendix contains the basic information of the 61 countries.
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Figure 1: Income, life expectancy, pension system and happiness
Figure (1) plots the relationship among GDP per capita, life expectancy, the presence or
5Table 1: Data sources
Indicators Database URL
Satisfaction
with life
(Happiness)
World
Database
of Happiness
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/
Life ex-
pectancy
World
Database
of Happiness
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/
Life ex-
pectancy at
birth, total
(years)
World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN
Happy life
years
World
Database
of Happiness
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/
Per capita
GDP
Penn World
Table
https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/
*) Happy life years are calculated by the product of Satisfaction with life and Life expectancy.
absence of a pension system and happiness. In Figure (1), each vertical axis shows the happiness.
o's and +'s represent the countries that have the pension system and do not, respectively. It
appears that there are positive relationships between income per capita and happiness, between
life expectancy and happiness, between pension and happiness, respectively. The coecients of
correlation are r(income per capita; happiness) = 0:833，r(life expectancy; happiness) = 0:788，
r(pension; happiness) = 0:390．
2.2 Regression Analysis
2.2.1 Happiness
We investigate the relationships between happiness and income per capita, between happiness
and life expectancy, between happiness and pension system. The happiness is treated as the
dependent variable. We use linear regression models as Eq. (1) to (4)．Eq. (1) has a single
regressor, income per capipa. Eq. (2) has two regressors, income per capita and life expectancy.
And, Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) have two regressors, income per capita and the presence or absence of
a pension system．We estimate the variables by the maximum likelihood esimation (MLE). The
maximum likelihood estimation is a method to maximize the likelihood function in estimating the
6variables. Hi, yi, Li and Pi represent the happiness level, income per capita, life expectancy and
the presence or absence of a pension system in a country i, respectively. Let us assume that the
errors i is identically distributed, independent random variables with i  N(0; 2). Table 2 is
the estimation results of Eq. (1) to (4), respectively.
Hi = 0 + 1yi + i (1)
Hi = 0 + 1yi + 2Li + i (2)
Hi = 0 + 1yi + 2Pi + i (3)
Hi = (1  Pi)(0 + 1yi) + Pi(0 + 1yi) + i (4)
Table 2: Estimation results
Parameters Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
0 -0.756 -0.926 -0.904 -2.535
t value -1.229 -1.515 -1.422 -1.870
1 0.789 0.587 0.824 1.036
t value 11.747 4.204 10.476 5.941
2 - 0.028 -0.220 -
t value - 1.632 -0.852 -
0 - - - -0.632
t value - - - -0.768
1 - - - 0.772
t value - - - 8.922
 0.706 0.691 0.702 0.692
t value 11.047 11.045 11.045 11.045
log likelihood value -65.32 -64.02 -64.96 -64.05
turning point 0 01 1 - - - 7.206
The upper and lower show the estimated values and t values, respectively.
The estimated all 1's for income per capita (y) in Eq. (1), (2) and (3) are positive and
signicant, but the estimated 2's in Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) for life expectancy (L) and the presence
or absence of a pension system (P ) are not signicant, respectively．We know that happiness can
be almost explained by income per capita and that the life expectancy and the pension system
contribute little to happiness. And we also know that from Eq. (4), the intercept (0 < 0)
and the slope (1 > 1) of the line relating per capita income and happiness are statistically and
signicantly dierent by the presence or absence of a pension system. From the results, we can
7say that when income per capita is low, happiness is higher with the pension system than without
it, otherwise, when income per capita is high, happiness is higher without the pension system
than with it. The turning point is about income per capita 1; 347 = exp(7:206) which is small
enough. When income level is low, the pension system make people happy. On the other hand,
when income level is high, the pension system which is a kind of the forced saving policies prevents
individuals from maximizing his/her utility. In other words, it suggests that to plan his/her own
future and to optimize his/her utility by himself/herself can be happier without the pension.
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Figure 2: Income, life expectancy and happiness
We visualize the regression results from Eq. (1) to Eq. (4) in Figure 2. Figure 2 (1) shows
regression lines based on Eq. (1) and Eq. (4). In comparison with the red line (P = 0) and the
blue line (P = 1), the slope of the red line is steeper than that of the blue line. We can nd that
when income per capita is low, the blue line is upper than the red line, that is, happiness is higher
with the pension than without it, but when income per capita is high, the opposite occures. The
red line is upper than the blue line, that is, happiness is higher without the pension than with
it. We draw the black line that best ts the data point in Figure 2 (1) from Eq. (1), and then,
for each country, we measure the gap between the country's actual level of happiness and the
level predicted by the tted line. Figure 2 (2) shows the relationship between the residual part
of happiness and life expectancy. Because happiness is explained by income per capita, there
is not high corellatonship between the residuals and life expectancy. The correlation coecient
is (r=0.096)．Figure 2 (2) means that 2 of Eq. (2) is not signicant. Figure 2 (3) shows the
8relationship between the residuals of life expectancy of the independent variable income per capita
and the residuals of happiness of the independent variable income per capita. When we remove
the inuence of income on life expectancy and happiness, the relationship between both variables
is not so strong (r=0.205). From the result of Figure 2 (2) and (3), we know that the positive
correlationship between life expectancy and happiness in Figure 1 (2) is a spurious relationship.
Even if we can see the relationship that the longer life expectancy looks happier, we know that
two variables have no direct causal connection and the income per capita actually works behind
the two variables, the life expectancy and happiness. The increasing life span without increasing
income does not necessarily increase happiness. It unfortunately suggests that the survival itself
is not always making utility high.
2.2.2 Life Expectancy and Happy Life Year
First, we investigate the relationships between the life expectancy and income per capita, between
the life expectancy and the pension system. The life expectancy is treated as the dependent
variable. We do regression analysis using Eq. (5) to Eq. (7). Eq. (5) has a single regressor,
income per capita. Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) have two regressors, income per capita and the presence
or absence of a pension system．We estimate the variables by the maximum likelihood esimation
like as what we did in Section 2.2.1.
Second, we also investigate the relationships between the happy life year and income per
capita, between the happy life year and the pension system. The happy life year is treated as the
dependent variable. The happy life years are calculated by the product of the level of happiness
and life expectancy. We do regression analysis using Eq. (8) to Eq. (10). HLi represents the
happy life year.
Li = 0 + 1yi + i (5)
Li = 0 + 1yi + 2Pi + i (6)
Li = (1  Pi)(0 + 1yi) + Pi(0 + 1yi) + i (7)
9HLi = 0 + 1yi + i (8)
HLi = 0 + 1yi ++2Pi + i (9)
HLi = (1  Pi)(0 + 1yi) + Pi(0 + 1yi) + i (10)
Table 3: Estimation results
Parameters Eq. (5) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (8) Eq. (9) Eq. (10)
0 6.070 7.568 -17.126 -39.142 -39.587 -55.242
t value 1.351 1.638 -1.834 -7.683 -7.480 -4.921
1 7.183 6.825 10.034 9.458 9.565 11.599
t value 14.652 11.947 8.356 17.016 14.611 8.034
2 - 2.223 - - -0.663 -
t value - 1.183 - - -0.308 -
0 - - 17.240 - - -35.525
t value - - 3.043 - - -5.216
1 - - 6.036 - - 9.064
t value - - 10.131 - - 12.653
 5.156 5.097 4.762 5.845 5.841 5.726
t value 11.045 11.045 11.045 11.045 11.045 11.045
log likelihood value -186.60 -185.91 -181.76 -194.26 -194.21 -193.00
turning point 0 01 1 - - 8.596 - - 7.779
The upper and lower show the estimated values and t values, respectively.
Table 3 shows the estimation results by Eq. (5) to Eq. (10). The results in Table 3 are
very similar to the results obtained with happiness as an independent variable in Table 1. The
estimated all 1's for income per capita (y) are positive and signicant, but the estimated 2's
for the presence or absence of a pension system (P ) are not signicant．From Eq. (6) and Eq.
(9), we know that because both the life expectancy and the happy life year are explained by
income per capita, the pension system itself has no explanatory power to both the life expectancy
and the happy life year. It means that the pension system itself cannot extend the life span and
the happy life year. From Eq. (7) and Eq. (10), we know that depending on the presence or
absence of a pension system, the intercept (0 < 0) and the slope (1 > 1) of the regression line
are statistically and signicantly dierent. From the results, we can say that when income per
capita is low, the life expectancy and the happy life year are longer with the pension system than
without it, otherwise, when income per capita is high, the life expectancy and the happy life year
are longer without the pension system than with it. The turning points of Eq. (7) and Eq. (10)
10
are about income per capita 5; 410 = exp(8:596) and 2; 390 = exp(7:779), respectively. Anyhow,
the values are low. In countries with low income levels, both the life expectancy and the happy
life year are increased by the pension system, on the other hand, in countries with high income
levels, both the life expectancy and the happy life year are decreased by the pension system. It
suggests that in countries with a high level of income, the individual's utility optimizations are
being hampered by the savings forced by the pension system.
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Figure 3: Income, life expectancy and happiness
Figure 3 shows regresion lines. Figure 3 (1) shows the relationship between income per capita
and the life expectancy. Figure 3 (2) shows the relationship between income per capita and the
happy life year. When we compare the red lines (P = 0) and the bule lines (P = 1), Figure 3
shows that the regression lines without the pension system are steeper than those with it.
2.2.3 Nonparametric estimation
We loosen the assumption of linear relationship between variables which we used in Section 2.2.1
and Section 2.2.2. We estimate the relationship by a nonparametric estimation which estimates the
regression function without assuming any specic form. Eq. (11) to Eq. (14) are the unknown
regression equations. The dependent variables in Eq. (11) to Eq. (14) are happiness, the life
expectancy and the happy life years and happiness, respectively. Each equation from Eq. (11)
to Eq. (13) have one regressor, income per capita and Eq. (14) has two regressors, income per
capita and the pension system.
11
Hi = f(yi) + i (11)
Li = f(yi) + i (12)
HLi = f(yi) + i (13)
Hi = f(yi; Pi) + i (14)
Figure 4 (1) to (4) are the regression results of Eq. (11) to Eq. (14), respectively. The
estimation results in Figure 4 (1) to (3) are not much dierent to the results obtained by assuming
a linear relationship like as what we did before. The red lines (P = 0) without the pension system
are steeper than the bule lines (P = 1) with the pension system. Because Eq. (14) has two
regressors, we depict the regression result by the contour line in Figure 4 (4). The contour line
shows the same level of happiness in the dierent combination of two variables which are income
per capital and pension system. When income per capita is low, it can be seen that the contour
lines are vertically-tilted. It means that regardless of whether the pension system is involved, the
level of happiness is almost the same. However, as income per capita increases, the contour lines
are no longer vertically-tilted. The contour lines begin to turn clockwise. For example, point A
where income per capita which is 8.5 without the pension system and point B where income per
capita which is 10.0 with the pension system have the same level of happiness, that is, the same
level of happiness is seven. In other words, if they have the same income, it is happier when there
is no pension system than when there is.
2.2.4 Check of Diminishing Marginal Increase of Life Expectancy
In countries with low income per capita, the increase of their life expectancy has a tendency to be
big, in contrast, in countries with high income per capita, the increase of their life expectancy has
a tendency to be small, that is, as income is increased, the marginal increase of the life expectancy
is apt to decrease. We check whether the diminishing phenomenon is the cause that the regression
lines in countries with low income per capita have steep slopes and the regression lines in countries
with high income per capita have glacis slopes, because it is possible that countries with high
income per capita tend to establish a pension system, in contrast, the countries with low income
per capita tend not to establish a pension system.
We do regression analysis using Eq. (15) and Eq. (16).2 We regress the change of life
2Because World Database of Happiness releases the average from 2000 to 2009 for life expectancy, there is no
12
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2
4
6
8
2
4
6
8
(1) Income and Happiness
Income per capita
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
x: P=0
o: P=1
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
20
40
60
80
20
40
60
80
(2) Income and Life expectancy
Income per capita
Li
fe
 e
x
pe
ct
an
dy
x: P=0
o: P=1
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
20
40
60
80
20
40
60
80
(3) Income and Happy life years
Income per capita
H
ap
py
 li
fe
 y
e
a
rs
x: P=0
o: P=1
(4) Contour of Happiness
Income per capita
P
e
n
s
io
n
 2.5 
 3  3.5  4 
 
4.
5 
 
5 
 
5.
5 
 6 
 
6.
5 
 6.5 
 
7 
 7 
 7.5 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
1
A
B
Figure 4: The results of nonparametric estimation
expectancy to the change of income
 
L
y

on initial income (y0) with Eq. (15). And, we also
regress the elasticity of the life expectancy for the income changes
 
L
y
y0
L0

on initial income (y0)
with Eq. (16). y0 and L0 show the income per capita and life expectancy in 2000 as initial values,
respectively. L and y show the dierence of values in the income per capita between 2000 to
2009 and the dierence of values in the life expectancy between 2000 to 2009, respectively. The
regression results from Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) show that the estimations for initial incomes are not
signicant and the coecients of determination (R2) are almost zero. Because we have used the
way to calculate the dierence of life expectancy, L = L2009   L2000. Therefore, we use the annual data for the
life expectancy and income per capita in World Bank and Penn World Table 7.1, respectively. The number of
observations in common is 145.
13
logarithm for GDP per capita in this paper, it can be said that the diminishing marginal increase
of the life expectancy are eliminated from the beginning. It is considered that the logarithm of
income per capita and the life expectancy have a relationship close to linear.

L
y

i
=15:455  0:874 y0i + i
t value (0:324) ( 0:157) R2 = 0:000
(15)

L
y
y0
L0

i
=2; 030  0:120 y0i + i
t value (0:328) ( 0:167) R2 = 0:000
(16)
3 The benchmark Model
In this section, we build a utility maximization model to analyze the relationship between the life
expectancy and happiness which we have seen in the previous section. The level of happiness and
the lifetime utility will be used in the same meaning.
3.1 Setting
We consider an individual's utility maximization problem under the nite period. He can live up
to T years old and die at the age of T . There is no uncertainty in the model and individuals have
perfect foresight. An individual maximizes his lifetime utility which is aected by consumption.
The instantaneous utility function is specied in log form as follows:
u(c) = ln c (17)
where c is a consumption. We think that it is possible to extend the life span by the eorts of the
individual. We assume that there is a linear relationship between health investment and the life
span as follows
T = a+ bz; (a > 0; b > 0) (18)
where T and z are life span and health investment, respectively. And a and b are positive
constants. We assume that the health investments do not aect the utility directly.3 We also
assume that the interest earning is the only source of income of the individual. And to simplify,
3We can divide consumption c into two categories. These are the general consumption cG and the consumption
for health improvement cH . The eect of the latter cH on the utility of individual is unclear whether positive or
negative. For example, there might be a person who drinks wheat grass for his health maintenance even though it
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a small country is assumed, then the interest rate is constant at all period. Let us denote the
individual's asset as x, then his budget constraint is written as:
_x = rx  c  z (19)
where r is an interest rate.
An individual's utility maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
c(t);T
Z T
0
e t ln c(t) dt; (0 <  < 1)
s:t _x(t) = rx(t)  c(t)  z
(20)
where  is a discount rate. We assume the  is constant, that is, our model is a exponential
discounting model, not a hyperbolic discounting model which is treated in behavioral economics.
We assume r  .4 For simplication, we assume that z has a constant value from initial period
until T period and that z is decided at the initial period. In an unrealistic assumption, we assume
that as an individual is born, he decides how much he invests for his health and how long he lives
under a social environment.
3.2 Solving the Model
The maximization problem is solved in two stages. At the rst stage, we do not consider the
Eq. (18), that is, T is a given value, not a control variable. At the second stage, we consider the
Eq. (18). First, maximize over c and x for any given T and z, and then the objective function
maximized with respect to c and x could be described as a function of T and z. Second, maximize
over T and z taking into account c obtained in the rst stage.
3.2.1 The First Stage
We use the Hamiltonian method to solve the maximization problem. The Hamiltonian is written
as follows:
H = ln c+ (rx  c  z) (21)
is unpalatable, while there might be a person who drinks it with the thinking that it is delicious. There might be
a person who commutes to the gym for his health maintenance though it is painful, while there might be a person
who goes happily to the gym. Nutritional supplements are benicial for health but are not delicious. Therefore,
we can assume that the consumption for health improvement cH is neutral to an individual's utility. This means
@u(cH )
@cH
=0 and u(cH) = u(cG; cH).
4If r = , there is no transitional path, because the jump from the initial state upto the terminal state occurs.
If r < , there is an overshooting, the economy turns back to the terminal state and has a negative growth rate.
We do not consider the negative growth in our analysis.
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By dierentiating Eq. (21) with respect to c and x, we can get Eq. (22) and Eq. (23).
@H
@c
=
1
c
   = 0 ) c =  1; (22)
@H
@x
=   _ = r )
_

=   r: (23)
We integrate Eq. (23) to time t, then we get
ln = (  r)t+ k (24)
where k is a constant of integration. Taking exponential both sides of Eq. (24), then we can get
 = C1e
( r)t (25)
where C1 = e
k. Substituting Eqs. (22) and (25) into Eq. (19), we obtain the following
_x  rx+ z =  C 11 e tert: (26)
This dierential equation is solved as follow
x =
1
C1
e t   1


ert + C2e
rt +
z
r
(27)
where C2 is a constant. See Appendix A.1 for the detailed calculation. C1 and C2 can be obtained
from substituting the initial condition and transversality condition. Let us x(0) = x0, then we
get C2 as follows
C2 = x0   z
r
: (28)
To maximize his utility, when dying, he uses up all his assets and leave nothing. In other words,
x(T ) = 0. We get C1 as follows
C1 =
1

1  e T
x0   (1  e rT ) zr
: (29)
Substituting Eqs. (28) and (29) into Eq. (27), we obtain the following
x(t) =
x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T (e
 t   1)ert + (x0   z
r
)ert +
z
r
: (30)
Substituting Eq. (25) into Eq. (22), we can get
c(t) = 
x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T e
(r )t: (31)
Eqs. (30) and (31) are the optimal paths of x and c, respectively by regarding the variable T and
z as xed.
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3.2.2 The Second Stage
In the second stage, to maximize his lifetime utility, the individual chooses his optimal T with
considering Eq. (18). We can rewrite the utility maximization problem as follows:
max
T
Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T e
(r )t

dt
s:t T = a+ bz
(32)
We solve the integral in Eq. (32), then we can induce Eq. (33)Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T e
(r )t

dt
=  ln


x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T
e T   1


  (r   )
(T + 1)e T   1
2
 (33)
See Appendix A.2 for the detailed calculation. Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (33), Eq. (32) can
be rewritten as Eq. (34) which has no integral and has only one control variable T . Eq. (34) is
just a static maximization problem, not a dynamic one.
max
T
ln


x0   (1  e rT )T arb
1  e T
1  e T


+ (r   )
1  (T + 1)e T
2

(34)
We take the derivative of Eq. (34) with respect to T and set the rst derivative to zero.
e T ln


x0   (1  e rT )T abr
1  e T

  1  e
 T
b
e rT (T   a) + (1  e rT )1r
x0   (1  e rT )T abr
  e T +(r )Te T = 0
(35)
Eq. (35) is an implicit function as f(x0; T ja; b; r; ) = 0 which is highly non linear and dicult to
solve analytically.
4 Pension System
We introduce a pension system into the benchmark model. There is no uncertainty in the model.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the eect of the pension system on the maximized utility
by comparing the maximized utility under the constraint by compulsory savings such as a pension
system and the maximized utility without the constraint. The presence of uncertainty is not the
essence in our model.5
He pays a pension p from 0 to s period, gets a pension q after s period to death. The
government decides p, q and s which are constants as given to individuals. This pension system
5Even if uncertainty is introduced in the model, the same conclusion could be reached, because the true substance
of this problem is the existence or lack of the constraint which prevents the utility from maximizing. We leave a
model whcih introduces an uncertainty for further study.
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plays as a compulsory saving for individuals. For simplication, we do not consider the balanced
budget of the government for the pension system. It can be a fully funded system or a pay-as-you-
go pension system, because we do not need to consider where the nancial resources of pension
come from, under the situation where there is no need for the balanced budget.
We shall call the period from 0 to s period as young period and after s period as old period.
His budget constraint Eq. (19) is changed to Eq. (36).
_x =
8<:rx  c  z   p; if 0  t  srx  c  z + q; if s < t  T: (36)
The way to solve the model with this pension system is similar to that of the benchmark model
even though we have to divide it into young period and old period. Eq. (27) is changed as follow
x =
8<:
1
CY1

e t 1


ert + CY2 e
rt + z+pr ; if 0  t  s
1
CO1

e t 1


ert + CO2 e
rt + z qr ; if s < t  T:
(37)
where, CY1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 are constants of integration which are as follows:
CY1 =
1

1  e s
x0   (1  e rs) z+pr   x(s)e rs
(38)
CY2 = x0  
z + p
r
(39)
CO1 =
1

(e T   e s)ers
z q
r (1  er(s T ))  x(s)
(40)
CO2 =
z q
r (1  er(s T ))  x(s)
(e T   e s)ers (1  e
 T )  z   q
r
e rT (41)
where, x(s) is interpreted as both the terminal value of young period and the initial value of old
period at the same time. By the same way as the previous, Eq. (31) is changed as follows
c(t) =
8<:
1
CY1
e(r )t; if 0  t  s
1
CO1
e(r )t; if s < t  T:
(42)
Substituting Eq. (42) into the utility function, we obtain the followingZ s
0
e t ln
 1
CY1
e(r )t

dt+
Z T
s
e t ln
 1
CO1
e(r )t

dt (43)
We integrate Eq. (43) to time t, then we get
ln
 1
CY1
1  e s

+ ln
 1
CO1
e s   e T

  (r   )
(T + 1)e T   1
2

: (44)
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There are z's in CY1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 . We substitute z =
T a
b into C
Y
1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 , then,
the original dynamic optimization problem with the pension system is nothing less than the static
optimization problem with respect to T and x(s) as seen in Eq. (45). In other words, all he has
to do is to decide his own life expectancy and the initial asset at the old period.
max
T;x(s)
U
 
T; x(s)

= ln
 1
CY1
 
T; x(s)
1  e s

+ ln
 1
CO1
 
T; x(s)
e s   e T

  (r   )
(T + 1)e T   1
2
 (45)
5 Results and Conclusion
Taking the derivative of Eq. (45) with respect to T and x(s), and setting each rst derivatives to
zero, and solving the system of equations, we could obtain the optimal T  and x(s). Since the
prot function of Eq. (45) is highly nonlinear, however, it is very dicult to get an exact analytical
solution for this problem. The alternative option is to provide the solutions numerically. The
suitable parameter values are used for the calculation, though they are arbitrary. The parameter
values that we use to calculate are the following: a = 20, b = 10, x0 = 100,  = 0:01, r = 0:02. In
order to investigate the eects of only the pension system, not including the eect of income, we
put initial income as a constant. And we control the parameters for pension system i.e., p, q and
s which are the amount of payment for pension, the amount of pension gratuity and the period
of payment for pension, respectively. To show the eects of p, q and s on the life expectancy and
the lifetime utility, p and q are controlled from 0.0 to 2.0, respectively, and s is controlled from
0.0 to 20.
Each panel in Figure 5 shows the results as the contour lines. Figure 5 (1) and 5 (2) show
the results of the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level, respectively, when s is xed at
10.0 while p and q are changed. In Figure 5 (1) and 5 (2), the values on the left-upper side are
high and the values on the right-lower side are low. Under xed s, when p is small and q is big,
the life expectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher. Figure 5 (3) and 5 (4) show
the results of the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level, respectively, when q is xed at 1.0
while p and s are changed. In Figure 5 (3) and 5 (4), the values on the left-lower side are high
and the values on the right-upper side are low. Under xed q, when p is small and s is short,
the life expectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher. Figure 5 (5) and 5 (6) show
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Figure 5: Life expectancy and lifetime utility level
the results of the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level, respectively, when p is xed at 1.0
while q and s are changed. In Figure 5 (5) and 5 (6), the values on the right-lower side are high
and the values on the left-upper side are low. Under xed p, when q is big and s is short, the life
expectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher.
To summarize these results, when p is small, when q is big, and when s is short, that is, when
an individual pays a small amount of money for a short period of time and gets a big amount
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of money from his pension, the life expectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher.
The increase in lifetime utility is hardly astonishing because the lifetime budget constraint of
an individual is shifted to the right when an individual receives more benets from the pension
system and has not to pay for it. These results accord with intuition.
Next, we show the relationship among the life expectancy, the lifetime utility and the pension
system through the combination of p, q and s and compare them with the results from the cross
section data in Section 2.
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Figure 6: Comparison of the results with and without the pension system
Figure 6 plots the relationship between the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level. By
changing of the paremeters for pension system which are the amount of payment for pension,
the amount of pension gratuity and the period of payment for pension, respectively, we get the
combinations of life expectation and life utility. The horizontal line and the vertical line show
the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level, respectively.6 The +'s in Figure 6 are the
corresponding values of the life expectancy in Figure 5 (1), 5 (3) and 5 (5), and the lifetime utility
level in Figure 5 (2), 5 (4) and 5 (6). And point A (24.556, 33.742) shows the pair of the life
expectancy and the lifetime utility level obtained from the benchmark model. All of these +'s
6The gures of the life expectancy tell nothing about the relative length of life expectancy. As the concept of
the ordinal utility, the dierences in the gures of the life expectancy are treated as meaningless. The gures do
not mean the number of years.
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except point A show the pairs when the pension system exists in some way or another. We draw
a vertical and horizontal line from point A and divide the plain into 4 areas. In area I, the life
expectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher compared to point A. In area II, the
life expectancy is longer but the lifetime utility level is lower compared to point A. In area III,
the life expectancy is shorter and the lifetime utility level is lower compared to point A. There is
no pair in area IV.
The life expectancy is not always proportional to the lifetime utility level. Comparing any '+'
in area II and point A, even though the life expectancy is longer, the lifetime utility level is lower.
And the pension system can make life expectancy longer or shorter and can make lifetime utility
level higher or lower. If we get big amounts of pension in the future, the life expectancy can be
extended and the lifetime utility can go up. It is the most preferable, however, in today's reality,
the pension system cannot avoid the problem of nancial resources.
The pension system could also lead to some kind of inrmity as follows: 1) Even though the
life expectancy is extended, the lifetime utility level goes down. By that, an individual is forced to
pay the pension during his young period, the pension system leads to less personal consumption
in his young period. Even though he tries to prolong his life for a long time to get his money back
which he paid mandatorily, his lifetime utility level can go down compared to a case of no pension
system. As rising longevity incited by the pension system, the years they gain in life expectancy
may not be healthy ones, so the increase in life expectancy requires more savings for health-care
spending in his/her old age and less consumption through his/her wholelife. It is also conrmed
from the data in Section 2 that the increase in life expectancy without an increase in income does
not aect too much utility. For example, this is the case of the right shift from point A on the
horizontal line. 2) The life expectancy is decreased, moreover, the lifetime utility level goes down.
This is the worst scenario. An individual can choose a short life to refuse to pay the pension until
such period s and to increase his consumption in his young period.7
The public pension system which is a compulsory savings crowds out the private savings and
can prevent the utility maximization. It is not always true that the pension system improves the
lifetime utility level as shown in area II and III in Figure 6. As we have seen in Section 2 with the
cross section data in the developed countries, the level of happiness and life excpectancy in the
case of no pension system are higher then those in the case with pension system. Not only the
7There was an accident reported in South Korea last 2005, where in a person who was against the compulsory
pension system and was in arrears with his pension took away his life.
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government has to exert eort to avoid inrmities as stated above, but the government also has
to reconsider about the raison d'etre (the reason for existence) of the compulsory pension system.
Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (27)
Let us put B =  C 11 . Multiplying both sides of Eq. (26) by e rt and integrating to time t, we
get the following
( _x  rx+ z)e rt = Be t
xe rt   z
r
e rt +D1 =  Be
 t

+D2
(A1)
where D1 and D2 are constants of integration. Eq. (A1) can be arranged as follows
xe rt   z
r
e rt =  Be
 t

+B
1

+ C2
x  z
r

e rt =  B
e t   1


+ C2
(A2)
where C2 = D2 D1 B 1 . Multiplying both sides of Eq. (A2) by e rt and substituting B =  C 11
into Eq. (A2), Eq. (A2) can be arranged as Eq. (27).
A.2 Derivation of Eq. (33)
Let us put A = ln


x0 (1 e rT ) zr
1 e T

.
Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T e
(r )t

dt =
Z T
0

Ae t + (r   )te t dt
=A
Z T
0
e t dt+ (r   )
Z T
0
te t dt =A
h
 e
 t

iT
0
  (r   )
h(t+ 1)e t
2
iT
0
= A
e T   1


  (r   )
(T + 1)e T   1
2

(A3)
Substituting A = ln


x0 (1 e rT ) zr
1 e T

into Eq. (A3), Eq. (A3) can be arranged as Eq. (33).
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